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NOTES
WRONGFUL LIFE RECOGNIZED IN
WASHINGTON: HARBESON V. PARKE-DAVIS
David C. Jarratt
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent Washington Supreme Court case of Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc.,' the court held that a child with a birth defect
may recover special damages for the tort of wrongful life. The
wrongful life cause of action involves a suit on behalf of an infant-
plaintiff for damages sustained as a result of being born with a
birth defect or disease. The claim is that the physician- defendant
failed to inform the plaintiff's parents of the potential defect, al-
lowing the continuation of a pregnancy that could have been
terminated.
By recognizing this novel cause of action, the Washington
court has refused to follow the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States and has joined California as the only states allowing
the wrongful life claims. This note will analyze the Washington
court's holding and its reasons for deviating from the majority rule.
It will also examine the cogent reasons for rejecting the wrongful
life cause of action.
II. THE FACTS
The wrongful life claim in Harbeson is based upon medical
care which Mrs. Jean Harbeson received at an Army medical
center while her husband was a member of the Air Force. In 1970,
Mrs. Harbeson learned that she was an epileptic and was given Di-
lantin, an anticonvulsant drug, to control her seizures. She began
taking the drug after their first child was conceived, and in 1971
she gave birth to a healthy, normal child.
After they were transferred to a base in Washington, the
Harbesons decided to have more children, but were concerned
about Mrs. Harbeson's continued use of Dilantin. She informed
three different doctors of their concerns and inquired about the
1. - Wash. 2d - , 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
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risks involved. Each of the doctors responded that the drug could
cause cleft palate and temporary hirsutism, but did not draw any
correlations between Dilantin and other birth defects.
The Harbesons relied upon the doctors and Mrs. Harbeson be-
came pregnant twice, giving birth in 1974 and 1975. During both of
these pregnancies she continued to take Dilantin as prescribed by
the doctors. As a consequence, both of the children suffer from
growth deficiencies, developmental retardation, and other physical
and developmental defects. Had the Harbesons been informed of
the potential of birth defects from the use of Dilantin during preg-
nancy, they would not have had any other children.
The case was tried in a Washington federal district court pur-
suant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.' Before giving a judgment,
the federal court certified the questions of law to the Washington
Supreme Court.
III. THE HOLDING
A. Wrongful Birth
In addition to the cause of action for wrongful life, a claim for
wrongful birth existed in Harbeson. In contrast to a wrongful life
suit, which is brought by the child born with a defect, a wrongful
birth suit is brought by the parents of an unhealthy child. The
claim can arise either from a failure to inform the parents of a
potential defect in the child or by negligent performance of a pro-
cedure to preventobirth of a defective child.3
The court in Harbeson held that parents have "a right to pre-
vent the birth of a defective child and health care providers a duty
correlative to that right."' 4 This duty requires health care providers
to give their patients information as to the possibility that a future
child will be born with defects, so that the potential parents can
decide whether to avoid the conception or birth of a child.' The
damage recovery in such a case may include (1) medical and hospi-
tal expense attributable to the child's birth and condition and (2)
damages for emotional injury suffered by the parents as a result of
the birth of the child.'
The court's holding on the wrongful birth issue is not a new
innovation in American law,' although Harbeson is a case of first
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2674-80 (1976).
3. Harbeson, - Wash. 2d -, 656 P.2d at 488.
4. Id. at 491.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 493.
7. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, - Pa. Super. -, 408 A.2d 496 (1979).
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impression on the question in Washington. The wrongful birth
claim was, however, closely tied by the court to the novel wrongful
life claim, and the reasoning used by the court in the former ques-
tion was carried over to the latter.
B. Wrongful Life
Whereas the wrongful birth cause of action has become fairly
common, wrongful life is a concept that has achieved little accept-
ance in American law. The cause of action has been rejected in
eight of the jurisdictions that have examined the issue,8 and only
California has upheld the right to sue for wrongful life.' And even
in California, while the infant plaintiff can sue for special damages,
he is prohibited from claiming general damges.'0
With the Harbeson decision, Washington has joined California
in accepting wrongful life as a valid claim for relief. The court in
Harbeson allowed the children born with defects to sue their phy-
sician for failure to inform Mr. and Mrs. Harbeson of the risks of
defects."' This failure prevented the Harbesons from terminating
the pregnancies. The standard of conduct which the court placed
upon physicians is the standard of the "average practitioner,"'"
and the duty which the physician owes to the child may even ex-
tend to a child not yet conceived at the time of the negligent act or
omission."' The only limit placed upon this duty to unconceived
children is that the duty extends only to those children
"foreseeably endangered by his conduct."' 4
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING
A. Arguments Against Wrongful Life
Unfortunately, the court in Harbeson brushed over the argu-
8. Alabama, Elliot v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546 (Ala. 1978); New Jersey, Berman v. Allan,
80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); New York, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Ohio, Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D.
Ohio 1975); Pennsylvania, Speck v. Finegold, - Pa. -, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); South
Carolina, Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980); Texas, Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Wisconsin, Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
9. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
10. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 235-36, 643 P.2d 954, 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337,
346-47 (1982).
11. Harbeson, - Wash. 2d - , 656 P.2d at 495.
12. Id. at 497.
13. Id. at 495.
14. Id.
19831
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ments against wrongful life claims with very little analysis or
thought. These arguments have merit and deserve to be carefully
considered before any court follows the Harbeson decision.
1. Tort Damages and Causation
The basic rule of tort damages is that compensation should be
paid to restore the plaintiff as nearly as possible to the position he
was in prior to the occurrence of the tort.1 5 In wrongful life cases,
however, this principal of tort law is impossible to apply. To place
the child in a position he would have been in if the defendant had
not been negligent would be to make the child non-existent, since
the claim is that absent the physician's negligence, the child never
would have been born.16 Obviously, this is impossible, and it makes
a mockery of the traditional basis for compensatory damages.
In addition, by allowing recovery in wrongful life causes of ac-
tion, the physician may well be required to pay damages for abnor-
malities that were in no way caused by his negligence. For exam-
ple, defects caused by genetic flaws in the parents are not created
by the fact that the physician failed to inform the parents of a
potential defect. The physician's only negligence is a failure to in-
form, which then results in a birth. And yet, under wrongful life,
the physician is required to pay damages not only for the birth,
but for defects which he neither caused nor could cure. To require,
therefore, that the physician pay damages for such defects is un-
fair, especially when it is the parents who bring the child into be-
ing and it is their genetic flaws which cause the damage. Finding
the physician liable necessarily stretches traditional notions of
proximate cause to an unreasonable degree.
2. Value of Life
Implicit in the acknowledgment of wrongful life claims is the
notion that the child would be better off never having been born
than to live a life with defects. Neither the court in Harbeson nor
the California decisions present any evidence that such is actually
the case. Indeed, whether it is better to have never been born at all
rather than to have been born with defects is a mystery which is
far beyond the realm of any court's ability to solve.11 It is also
quite probable that weighty evidence can be produced to show that
persons born with defects can lead happy, useful lives in our
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1977).
16. Speck v. Finegold, - Pa. Super. -, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (1979).
17. Id.
[Vol. 44
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society.
A second argument made in this area is that the infant plain-
tiff in a wrongful life suit has not suffered any wrong by being
brought into existence.18 No wrong exists since the law has always
considered life more precious than non-life; the value placed on life
is pronounced in both the Constitution and Declaration of Inde-
pendence.19 Nowhere in these documents or in American law does
it say that a handicapped life is less cherished than a nonhandicap-
ped life.
3. Claims Against Parents
With the acceptance of wrongful life as a valid cause of action,
the door is wide open for claims by children against their parents
when the child has been born with some type of defect. The child
may claim parental negligence for failure to terminate the preg-
nancy which resulted in the handicap. In fact, the California deci-
sion which validated wrongful life claims suggested that such
claims against the parents would be proper in certain settings. 0
To allow claims against parents for wrongful birth could -make
the parents liable for damages to their own child even when the
odds of having a defective child are small or when the parents are
morally opposed to abortion. Chief Justice Weintraub of the New
Jersey Supreme Court recognized this danger in 1967:
Implicit (in wrongful life claims), beyond the claim against a phy-
sician for faulty advice, is the proposition that a pregnant woman
who, duly informed, does not seek an abortion, and all who urge
her to see the pregnancy through, are guilty of wrongful injury to
the fetus, and indeed that every day in which the infant is sus-
tained after birth is a day of wrong. To recognize a right not to be
born is to enter an area in which no one can find his way. 21
Claims for wrongful life by a child against his parents would
clearly restrict the parents' decision of whether to have a child or
not, since there would be a well-founded fear that suits could re-
sult from the birth.
B. Weakness of the Harbeson Rationale
The court in Harbeson stated two main reasons for embracing
wrongful life as a valid cause of action. Upon close examination
18. Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 428-29, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979).
19. U.S. CONST. art. V, XIV; The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
20. Curlender, 106 Cal. App.3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
21. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967).
1983]
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and analysis, however, these reasons appear not very compelling.
The first reason given by the court was that it would be illogical to
permit wrongful birth claims and not wrongful life claims, espe-
cially since the child's medical needs will not disappear when the
child reaches majority.2 2 But it is not really so illogical in light of
the reasons advanced for denying the wrongful life claims. As
shown, wrongful life suffers from serious problems in the areas of
damages, causation, the value of life, and claims against parents.
Those problems, especially on damages and claims against parents,
do not necessarily apply to wrongful birth cases. Therefore, wrong-
ful birth and wrongful life are not completely interchangeable. Be-
cause of the legal and policy difficulties, it may well be illogical to
accept wrongful life as a valid claim for relief.
Additionally, the court reasoned that imposing a duty owed to
the child would help foster the objectives of prenatal testing and
genetic counseling, while at the same time discouraging malprac-
tice.2 It is possible that wrongful life claims could foster these
objectives, but they are already fostered through the use of wrong-
ful birth claims. Failure to accept wrongful life as a cause of action
would not leave physicians free to ignore prenatal testing and ge-
netic counseling, since they would be aware of the potential wrong-
ful birth suits which could await them. A new cause of action,
therefore, is not needed to foster the stated objectives; the pres-
ently available cause of action is sufficient.
V. CONCLUSION
The Harbeson decision is of major importance in American
tort law, especially since Washington rejected the majority rule
and is the first state to follow California in recognizing wrongful
life as a valid cause of action. Nonetheless, there are serious legal
and social problems associated with wrongful life, and these
problems are themselves strong and compelling reasons to reject
the cause of action. The courts of other states should carefully ana-
lyze such problems before following the Harbeson decision.
22. Harbeson, - Wash. 2d - , 656 P.2d at 495.
23. Id. at 496.
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